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Résumé / Abstract
Nous étudions dans cet article les interactions entre la structure de
financement des firmes et leur choix technologique, en particulier leur flexibilité
technologique. Lorsqu'il existe des coûts de faillite, une firme endettée peut
modifier ses choix stratégiques afin de diminuer sa probabilité de faillite. Nous
montrons, dans le cas où la capacité de la technologie inflexible est faible
(élevée), que l'endettement d'une firme peut conduire cette dernière à choisir une
technologie moins (plus) flexible. Ces effets de l'endettement sur les choix
technologiques peuvent, dans un oligopole, faire l'objet d'un choix stratégique.
Nous montrons qu'il existe des cas où l'endettement est utilisé par les firmes
comme un outil de collusion partielle et d'autres cas où l'endettement améliore la
position stratégique d'une firme au détriment de sa concurrente.
We study the interactions between the capital structure and the
technological flexibility choices of firms in a duopoly. When there are bankruptcy
costs, a leveraged firm may modify its strategic choices in order to decrease its
probability of bankruptcy. We show that, when the capacity level of the inflexible
technology is small (large), debt may induce firms to choose less (more) flexible
technologies. Debt may be used in a strategic way. We show that debt can be used
as a partial collusion tool to increase the expected profits of both firms. We show
also that a firm may use debt as a commitment device to increase its own expected
profit to the detriment of its rival.
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1 Introduction
According to many business gurus and commentators, exibility has become the Holy Grail in
the `new' economic or business environment because developments in globalization, in informa-
tion technologies and in manufacturing technologies have made the markets signicantly more
volatile. The increased exibility is obtained through reengineering, outsourcing, downsizing, fo-
cusing on core competencies, investing in computer controlled exible technologies, empowering
key individuals with specic human capital, and more generally designing more powerful incen-
tive systems and corporate governance rules to ensure better congruence of interests throughout
the rm. Business International (1991) claims that the search for exibility is the all-inclusive
concept allowing an integrated understanding of most if not all recent developments in manage-
ment theory. It claims also that reorganizing a rm to increase its exibility requires a concerted
eort on many levels: introducing atter organizational structures, investing in automated man-
ufacturing, creating strong but malleable alliances, introducing decision and incentive systems
centered on results, etc. In the words of economic theorists, this means harnessing and exploiting
the supermodularity in the set of strategies.
We reconsider here these claims in a context of oligopolistic competition under uncertainty in
order to clarify the issues pertaining to the relationships between exibility, nancial structure
and bankruptcy costs. As we will see, exibility has both positive and negative features and
therefore the choice of its level in a corporation raises more subtle strategic issues than suggested
in the gurus' writing and in the management literature in general. In terms of investment, a ex-
ible manufacturing system capable of producing a wider array or scope of products will typically
be more expensive than a dedicated manufacturing system, not only in terms of the investment
cost per se but also in terms of its impact on the internal organization of the rm and on its rela-
tions with suppliers and customers.
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The evaluation of the proper exibility spectrum in a rm,
whether this exibility comes from technological, organizational or contractual characteristics
and decisions, requires an evaluation of the ne trade-o between the value and cost of changes
in the real options portfolio so created, in the probability of bankruptcy, in the probability of
1
See Gerwin (1982, 1993), Mensah and Miranti (1989), Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Boyer and Moreaux
(1997) for convincing examples.
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being preempted in signicant markets, and of changes in the behavior of competitors, actual
and potential, who may be more or less aggressive towards the rm depending on its level of
exibility. The analysis of these issues requires modeling strategic competition with explicit and
specic features related to exibility.
In that vein, we consider a duopolistic context with endogenous capital structures and tech-
nological exibility choices in which rms can fall into costly bankruptcy. In such a context,
one expects that the debt level can change the technological exibility choice of a rm since
the latter modies in an important way the distribution of cash ows over the dierent states
of demand. In turn, it implies rst that debt may be used strategically and second that the
nancial and technological choices of a rm are simultaneously determined.
Brander and Lewis (1986) show that the debt level may have a signicant impact in a strategic
context. In an oligopolistic market under uncertain demand conditions, limited liability induces
rms to take more risky positions as in Jensen and Meckling (1976). The debt level works as a
credible commitment device. By increasing its debt level, a rm can, at the Cournot stage of the
game, decrease the equilibrium production level of its rival while increasing its own production
level: debt has a strategic value. With bankruptcy costs, the link between debt and production
is more ambiguous: Brander and Lewis (1988) show that debt can either increase or decrease the
competitive position of the rm. Several other authors have contributed to clarifying the eects
of the capital structure on the production level of a rm in an oligopoly: in some contexts, debt
improves the competitive position of the rm but in others, debt is a source of weakness.
2
2
Maksimovic (1988) analyses the impact of debt on the possibilities to sustain collusion. Poitevin (1989, 1990)
argues that debt may allow to signal low production cost. Glazer (1994) solves a two period model in which debt
is repaid at the end of the last period; in the second period debt is pro-competitive but, in the rst period, debt
allows some kind of collusion because an increase in the rival's prot decreases its residual debt and make it less
aggressive in the last period. Showalter (1995, 1999) analyses the Bertrand competition case; he shows that the
optimal strategic debt choice depends on the type of uncertainty that exists in the output market: if costs are
uncertain, rms do not leverage but, if demand conditions are uncertain, rms carry positive strategic debt levels
in order to soften competition. In an entry framework, the incumbent wants to commit credibly to choose a low
price in order to deter entry, hence to be in debt if costs are uncertain and debt free if demand is uncertain. In
a similar framework, Schnitzer and Wambach (1998) investigate the choice between inside and outside nancing
by risk-averse entrepreneurs who produce with uncertain production costs. Parsons (1997) expands the model
of Brander and Lewis (1988) by allowing corner solutions; with this specication, rms may initially have an
incentive to decrease output levels if they take on more debt. Hughes, Kao and Mukherji (1998) show that the
possibility to acquire and share information may destroy Brander and Lewis's (1986) result. Dasgupta and Shin
(1999) show that, when one rm has better access to information, leverage may be a way for the rival rm to
free-ride on the rm's information. In Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), debt decreases the probability that the rm
will survive and therefore increases the probability that rivals will prey on it.
2
All these studies assume a given technology, more precisely a given cost function. But as
emphasized by Stigler (1939), rms have some degrees of freedom in choosing their cost functions.
In this spirit, Vives (1989), Lecostey (1994) and Boyer and Moreaux (1997) among others show
that a way to commit to a production strategy in an oligopolistic market with uncertain demand
conditions is to choose an inexible technology. The trade-o in this case is that a rm choosing
an inexible technology can, if the capacity of the inexible technology is relatively low [high],
reduce the market share of its rival in states of low [high] demand but cannot fully exploit [but
shuts down in] the states of high [low] demand. In the present paper, we consider oligopolistic
market settings and we analyze the technological choice and the nancial structure as joint
strategic decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the model in section 2. We derive in section
3 the prots of the rms for given technologies and we infer the debt contracts and the debt
thresholds of bankruptcy. In section 4, we study the impact of debt on the technological exibility
choices. In section 5, we discuss the strategic value of being in debt and the existence of jointly
optimal capital and technological structures. We conclude in section 6.
2 The model
The inverse demand function is assumed to be linear:
3
p = max(0;    Q)
whereQ is the aggregate output and  is a random variable taking two values, 
1
with probability
 and 
2
with probability 1  , with 
2
> 
1
.
Firms choose between two available technologies: one is inexible (i) and the other is exible
(f). An inexible rm either produces x, where x is the exogenous capacity, or shuts down. A
exible rm can choose any positive level of production. The two technologies have the same
average operating cost c, but the sunk costs dier. The sunk cost of an inexible technology is
K; this cost may be composed of product design costs, land purchases, plant construction costs,
3
Demand linearity and all the other specic assumptions as constant marginal cost are made only to get
tractable explicit solutions. The reader will understand that our assumptions could be relaxed at the cost of more
complexity and less transparency in the results.
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marketing cost, and so on. The sunk cost of a exible technology is K +H where H > 0.
Initially, entrepreneur h 2 f1; 2g has a capital of A
h
. This capital level is exogenous, an
assumption we will relax in section 5. If A
h
is less than K or K + H, the entrepreneur must
borrow additional capital from a bank. Banks can observe each rm's technological exibility
choice but neither the level of demand nor the prots of the rms.
4
So a debt contract species
a level of repayment R independent of the level of demand and prot but dependent on the
technological choices of both rms. If a rm is unable to repay R, it goes bankrupt and its gross
prot is seized by the bank. For matter of simplicity, we avoid introducing incentive constraints
in the problem by assuming that in case of bankruptcy, courts can check the books of the rm,
nd the liars and impose on them harsh punishment.
5
We assume also that the banking sector
is perfectly competitive and therefore a bank accepts a contract if and only if the expected
repayment is at least equal to the payo which would be obtained in lending at the riskless
interest rate, normalized at zero.
The entrepreneurs have limited liability but bankruptcy generates non-monetary costs for
an entrepreneur since bankruptcy sends a bad signal on his management skills, making it harder
for him to nd a new job or to borrow new capital to nance another project. Furthermore,
bankruptcy generates high transaction costs. These costs are assumed to have a monetary
equivalent value B, independent of the level of default.
The two entrepreneurs begin the game with observable amounts of equity A
1
and A
2
. The
timing of the game is as follows. First, the entrepreneurs simultaneously negotiate debt contracts
as functions of the technological conguration to emerge in the industry. Second, they choose
simultaneously their respective technology. Hence, the debt contracts and the technologies, or
the exibility levels, are chosen simultaneously within a rm and across rms. Third, they
observe the level of demand and engage in Cournot competition. Finally, rms repay debt or
go bankrupt. Regarding the exogenous capacity level x, we assume that in the high state of
demand, both rms produce and avoid bankruptcy at the Cournot stage of the game whatever
their technological choices, that is x < (
2
  c)=2. They may go bankrupt in the low state of
4
This assumption of unobservability of prots is introduced so as to make the standard debt contract optimal
(see Bolton and Scharfstein 1990).
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In other words, prots are unobservable by banks but veriable by courts, an assumption which can be
justied by the investigation power of courts as compared to banks.
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demand. More precisely, we consider the following three possible cases:
 x 2 X
1
 fx j x < (
1
 c)=2g (small capacity): when demand is low, both rms produce
at the Cournot stage of the game for any technological choices;
 x 2 X
2
 fx j (
1
  c)=2 < x < (
1
  c)=gg (intermediate capacity): when demand is
low, technological congurations (f; f) and (f; i) imply the same equilibria as when x 2 X
1
,
whereas (i; i) implies that one rm shuts down and the other obtains its monopoly prot;
 x 2 X
3
 fx j (
1
  c)= < xg (large capacity): when demand is low, technological
conguration (f; f) implies the same equilibria as above, (f; i) implies that the inexible
rm shuts down whereas the exible rm enjoys a monopoly prot level, and (i; i) implies
that both rms shut down.
This model is the simplest possible tractable strategic model capturing the relevant character-
istics of the `new' economic or business environment as discussed above, of the interdependence
between nancial structure and technology choice (endogenous cost function), and of optimal
nancial contracting under asymmetric information (adverse selection) and bankruptcy cost.
3 The expected prots as functions of technological choices
Debt levels play a crucial role in the product competition stage because it determines the prob-
ability of bankruptcy. We characterize in this section the debt threshold, over which the rm
cannot repay its debt in the bad state of demand, as a function of technological congurations.
For t; t
0
2 fi; fg and any X 2 fX
1
;X
2
; X
3
g, we shall denote by 
k
(t; t
0
;X) the prot of a rm
with technology t facing a rival with technology t
0
when x 2 X and  = 
k
2 f
1
; 
2
g, by
E(t; t
0
;X) the expected prot of a rm before the demand level is revealed, and by D(t; t
0
;X)
the debt threshold over which the rm goes bankrupt when the demand is low. The Cournot
equilibrium prots over operating costs, as functions of the technological choices of the rms,
are given in Appendix A.
5
3.1 Financial contract and expected prot of a exible rm
When demand is low, the gross prot of a exible rm is equal to 
1
(f; t
0
; X) which denes the
debt threshold
6
D(f; t
0
;X) = 
1
(f; t
0
;X) (1)
Thus if the debt of the rm is lower than D(f; t
0
;X), the rm never goes bankrupt. The
banking sector is perfectly competitive and so the repayment R
h
is equal to the amount borrowed
K +H  A
h
.
R
h
= K +H  A
h
: (2)
On the other hand, if the rm's debt is larger than D(f; t
0
;X), the rm goes bankrupt when
demand is low. In this bad state of the market, the rm repays only its gross prot, an amount
lower than the amount it should repay. So in the good state, the rm must repay an amount R
h
such that the expected prot of the bank is equal to zero, that is 
1
(f; t
0
; X) + (1  )R
h
=
K +H  A
h
. Hence, R
h
as a function of (f; t
0
) is given by:
R
h
=
1
1  

K +H  A
h
  
1
(f; t
0
;X)

: (3)
We can obtain the expected prot as follows. For low debt levels, the rm never goes bankrupt
and its expected prot is 
1
(f; t
0
;X) + (1  )
2
(f; t
0
; X)   R
h
  A
h
where R
h
is given by
(2). For large debt levels, the rm goes bankrupt if demand is low; its expected prot is
(1  ) [
2
(f; t
0
;X) R
h
]   B   A
h
where R
h
is now given by (3). Thus, making use of (2)
and (3), we obtain that the expected prot of the entrepreneur is given by:
E(f; t
0
; X) =
8
>
<
>
:
d
E (f; t
0
;X) ; if K +H  A
h
 D(f; t
0
;X)
d
E (f; t
0
;X)  B; if K +H  A
h
> D(f; t
0
;X)
(4)
where
d
E (f; t
0
;X) is the expected prot when the rm does not go bankrupt:
d
E
 
f; t
0
;X

=


1
(f; t
0
;X) + (1  )
2
(f; t
0
; X)

  (K +H) : (5)
6
When a exible rm faces an inexible rm with a large capacity (x 2 X
3
), the exible rm may earn more
prot when demand is low, in which case the inexible rm shuts down and the exible one is a monopolist, than
when demand is high, in which case the inexible rm captures a large market share. It may therefore happen
that the exible rm avoids bankruptcy when the demand is low but goes bankrupt when the demand is high !
We do not study such cases.
6
The dierence between the two prot levels is the expected bankruptcy cost. The dierent
values of 
1
(), D() and
d
E() are given in Appendix A.
3.2 Financial contract and expected prot of an inexible rm
If either x 2 X
1
[X
3
and t
0
2 fi; fg or x 2 X
2
and t
0
= f , the gross prot of an inexible rm
is equal to 
1
(i; t
0
; X) which denes the debt threshold
D(i; t
0
;X) = 
1
(i; t
0
; X) (6)
If it has a debt lower than this gross prot, it never goes bankrupt and R
h
= K A
h
. Otherwise
it goes bankrupt and the zero expected payo condition of the bank takes the form 
1
(i; t
0
;X)+
(1  )R
h
= K  A
h
, implying that:
R
h
=
1
1  

K  A
h
  
1
(i; t
0
;X)

: (7)
Its expected prot is therefore given by
E
 
i; t
0
;X

=
8
>
<
>
:
d
E (i; t
0
;X) ; if K  A
h
 D(i; t
0
; X)
d
E (i; t
0
;X)  B; if K  A
h
> D(i; t
0
; X)
(8)
where
d
E
 
i; t
0
;X

= 
1
(i; t
0
; X) + (1  )
2
(i; t
0
;X)  K: (9)
If both rms are inexible and x 2 X
2
, only one rm produces if demand is low. We assume
that the producing rm is determined randomly with probability 1/2. Hence we must dene
two debt thresholds in this case:
^
D(i; i;X
2
) = 0 if the rm does not produce and D(i; i;X
2
) =

1
(i; i;X
2
) if it produces. Each rm goes bankrupt with probability 1/2 if K  A
h
< D(i; i;X
2
)
and with probability 1 if K   A
h
> D(i; i;X
2
). The repayment amount R
h
to be paid when
 = 
2
is given in the former case by
R
h
=
1
1  =2
(K  A
h
) (10)
and in the latter case by
R
h
=
1
1  

K  A
h
 
1
2

1
(i; i;X
2
)

: (11)
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Making use of (10) and (11), we obtain the expected prot, equal for both rms:
E(i; i;X
2
) =
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:
d
E(i; i;X
2
) ; if K  A
h
 0
d
E(i; i;X
2
) 
1
2
B; if 0 < K  A
h
 D(i; i;X
2
)
d
E(i; i;X
2
)  B; if K  A
h
> D(i; i;X
2
)
(12)
where
d
E (i; i;X
2
) = 
1
2

1
(i; i;X
2
) + (1  ) 
2
(i; i;X
2
) K: (13)
4 The impact of equity on technological choices
A rm's cost of borrowing, expected prot and probability of bankruptcy are determined by the
technological conguration of the industry and its own level of equity. Hence the technological
best reply of a rm to the technological choice of its competitor depends on its own equity level.
To characterize the impact of equity nancing on the technological equilibrium in an industry,
we must rst study its impact on the technological best reply functions. We will illustrate our
results with examples for each of the three cases of small, intermediate and large capacity of the
inexible technology.
A rm's debt level is given by the cost of the technology it chooses, either K or K + H,
minus its equity A
h
. For a given technological conguration, a rm's expected prot is a constant
function of the debt level provided that the rm can make the repayment even when the demand
is low; when debt is high, the expected net prot is reduced by the expected bankruptcy costs.
Bankruptcy allows a standard debt contract to be an elegant and simple solution to the adverse
selection problem raised by the unobservability of prot. Without that agency problem, the
optimal nancing contract would be a prot sharing contract under which the rm would never
go bankrupt. If there is no bankruptcy cost, we nd the well known Modigliani and Miller
(1958) result: the capital structure of the rm is irrelevant, as shown by the best reply functions
derived in Appendix B.
Proposition 4.1 If there is no bankruptcy costs (B=0), the technological choices are indepen-
dent of the rms' capital structure.
With bankruptcy costs, the need to borrow may induce the rm to choose a dierent technology.
8
4.1 The best response to inexibility
Suppose that a rm chooses the inexible technology. To determine the competitor's best re-
sponse, we must determine the value of its expected prot dierential E(i; i;X) E(f; i;X),
for X 2 fX
1
;X
2
;X
3
g, which for each X is a step function of its equity. The qualitative charac-
teristics of these functions turn out to be the same for X
1
and X
3
but dier for X
2
.
4.1.1 The case X 2 fX
1
;X
3
g
Let A(i; i;X) and A(f; i;X) be the minimum equity required for not going bankrupt in the low
state of demand when choosing respectively the inexible and the exible technology, that is:
A(i; i;X) = K  D(i; i;X)
A(f; i;X) = K +H  D(f; i;X)
(14)
and so, A(i; i;X) < A(f; i;X) i H > 
1
(f; i;X)   
1
(i; i;X).
If a rm's equity is relatively low [large], the rm [never] goes bankrupt if demand is low
whatever its technology. Hence the technological best response in these two cases will be the
same and independent of the expected cost of bankruptcy B. For intermediate levels of equity,
that is a level between the critical levels (14), whether or not a rm goes bankrupt in the low
state of demand will depend on its technology and therefore its best response will depend on
the expected bankruptcy cost B:
 If A(i; i;X) < A(f; i;X) and if its equity falls between those two critical values, that is if
A(i; i;X) < A
h
< A(f; i;X), the rm goes bankrupt in the low state of demand i it has
a exible technology.
 If A(f; i;X) < A(i; i;X) and if A(f; i;X) < A
h
< A(i; i;X), the rm goes bankrupt in the
low state of demand i it has an inexible technology.
The formal characterization of a rm's technological best reply to the technological choice of its
competitor is given in Appendix B. From (4) and (8), we obtain the following two propositions.
Proposition 4.2 (For x 2 X 2 fX
1
;X
3
g): If A(i; i;X) < A(f; i;X), a switch occurs in the
technological best response to inexibility as equity A
h
increases i
d
E(f; i;X) >
d
E(i; i;X)
9
(exibility is the best response under no debt) and B >
d
E(f; i;X) 
d
E(i; i;X) (the expected
cost of bankruptcy is suÆciently high). In such a case, the best response to inexibility is
exibility for low levels of equity, inexibility for intermediate levels of equity, exibility for high
levels of equity.
Proposition 4.3 (For x 2 X 2 fX
1
;X
3
g): If A(f; i;X) < A(i; i;X), a switch occurs in the
best response to inexibility as equity A
h
increases i
d
E(i; i;X) >
d
E(f; i;X) (inexibility
is the best response under no debt) and B >
d
E(i; i;X)  
d
E(f; i;X) (the expected cost of
bankruptcy is suÆciently high). In such a case, the best response to inexibility is inexibility
for low levels of equity, exibility for intermediate levels of equity, inexibility for high levels of
equity.
4.1.2 The case X = X
2
For the intermediate capacity level of the inexible technology, the analysis is a bit more complex.
By choosing the inexible technology, a rm facing an inexible competitor will, if demand is low,
either never go bankrupt if its equity is higher than K (it then has no debt), or goes bankrupt
with probability 1/2 if its equity is lower than K but higher than A(i; i;X
2
) = K  D(i; i;X
2
),
or always go bankrupt if its equity is lower than A(i; i;X
2
). If the rm chooses instead the
exible technology, the minimum level of equity necessary to avoid bankruptcy in the low state
of demand is A(f; i;X
2
) = K +H  D(f; i;X
2
). Since A(i; i;X
2
) < K, we must now examine
three possibilities depending on whether A(f; i;X
2
) is higher thanK, between K and A(i; i;X
2
),
or lower than A(i; i;X
2
). From (4), (8) and (12), we obtain the following two propositions.
Proposition 4.4 (For x 2 X
2
): The technological best response to inexibility goes from ex-
ibility to inexibility and to exibility again as equity A
h
increases, under two sets of condi-
tions. First, when K < A(f; i;X
2
) i
d
E(f; i;X
2
) >
d
E(i; i;X
2
) and B >
d
E(f; i;X
2
)  
d
E(i; i;X
2
); second, when A(i; i;X
2
) < A(f; i;X
2
) < K i
d
E(f; i;X
2
) >
d
E(i; i;X
2
) and
B > 2
h
d
E(f; i;X
2
) 
d
E(i; i;X
2
)
i
.
7
7
In the rst case, the levels of equity for which inexibility is the best response are given by A
h
2
(A(i; i; X
2
); A(f; i; X
2
)) or A
h
2 (K;A(f; i;X
2
)) according to whether
c
E(f; i;X
2
)  
c
E(i; i; X
2
) is lower or
higher than
1
2
B.
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Proposition 4.5 (For x 2 X
2
): The technological best response to inexibility goes from in-
exibility to exibility and to inexibility again as equity A
h
increases, under two sets of con-
ditions. First, when A(i; i;X
2
) < A(f; i;X
2
) < K i
d
E(i; i;X
2
) >
d
E(f; i;X
2
) and B >
2
h
d
E(i; i;X
2
) 
d
E(f; i;X
2
)
i
; second, when A(f; i;X
2
) < A(i; i;X
2
) < K i
d
E(i; i;X
2
) >
d
E(f; i;X
2
) and B >
d
E(i; i;X
2
) 
d
E(f; i;X
2
).
8
4.2 The best response to exibility
Let us dene A(i; f;X) and A(f; f;X) for X 2 fX
1
; X
2
; X
3
g as the minimum level of equity
required to avoid bankruptcy when the rm chooses respectively the inexible and the exible
technology whereas the other rm is a exible rm, that is:
A(i; f;X) = K  D(i; f;X) ; A(f; f;X) = K +H  D(f; f;X): (15)
An argument similar to the argument developed for characterizing the best response to inexi-
bility leads to the following propositions.
Proposition 4.6 (For X 2 fX
1
;X
2
;X
3
g): When A(i; f;X) < A(f; f;X), a switch occurs in the
best response to exibility as A
h
increases i
d
E(f; f;X) >
d
E(i; f;X) and B >
d
E(f; f;X) 
d
E(i; f;X). In such a case, the best response to exibility is exibility for low levels of equity,
inexibility for intermediate levels, exibility for high levels.
Proposition 4.7 (For X 2 fX
1
;X
2
;X
3
g): When A(i; f;X) > A(f; f;X), a switch occurs in the
best response to exibility as A
h
increases i
d
E(i; f;X) >
d
E(f; f;X) and B >
d
E(i; f;X) 
d
E(f; f;X). In such a case, the best response to exibility is inexibility for low levels of equity,
exibility for intermediate levels, inexibility for high levels.
4.3 Examples
The following examples show how the above best response functions generate equilibrium techno-
logical congurations in the industry as functions of the equity levels of the rms. The examples
are worked out in Appendix C.
8
In the second case, the levels of equity for which exibility is the best response are given by A
h
2
(A(f; i;X
2
); K) or A
h
2 (A(f; i; X
2
); A(i; i; X
2
)) according to whether
c
E(i; i; X
2
)  
c
E(f; i; X
2
) is lower or
higher than
1
2
B.
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Example 1: x 2 X
1
;  = 0:5; 
1
= 5; 
2
= 10; x = 2;  = 1; c = 0:2; K = 4; H = 1; B = 2.
We consider rst a common equity level for both rms, that is A
h
= A for h = 1; 2 (Figure 1),
before looking at the more general case of asymmetric levels (Figure 1
0
).
-
FIGURE 1 (example 1)
[in Y, (f; f) and (i; i)]
A
0
(f; f)
1.2
(f; i), (i; f)
2.4
(i; i)
2.44
Y
3.04
(f; f)
5.00
If the common equity level can cover the cost of both technologies (A = 5), both rms choose
the exible technology in equilibrium. If 2:44 < A < 3:04, there are two Nash equilibria in which
both rms choose the same technology, either the exible or the inexible one. For those equity
levels, the rms fall into a exibility trap, a coordination failure, as shown in Appendix C. If
2:4 < A < 2:44, the unique equilibrium is (i; i). If 1:2 < A < 2:4, the equilibrium is asymmetric,
(f; i) or (i; f). Finally, if the common equity level is small (A < 1:2), the equilibrium is again
(f; f).
When the equity levels are dierent, new cases appear (see Figure 1
0
).
Insert Figure 1
0
here
There are values for which the unique equilibrium is asymmetric, (f; i) or (i; f). There are
also two sets of values for which there exist no equilibrium in pure strategies. Within these
sets, one rm's best reply is to mimic the technological choice of its rival while for the other,
it is to choose a technology dierent from its rival's. One should notice that the technological
choice of a rm is not a monotonic function of its equity level, given the equity level of its
competitor: for example, if A
1
is in the interval (0; 1:2), rm 2 chooses the exible technology
if its equity level is small, that is, if A
2
2 (0; 1:2), the inexible technology for intermediate
equity levels, that is, for A
2
2 (1:2; 2:44), and again the exible technology if its equity level
is large, that is, if A
2
2 (2:44; 5). Also, the technological choice of a rm is not a monotonic
function of the equity level of its competitor, given its own equity level: for example, if A
1
is
12
in the interval (1:2; 2:4), rm 1 chooses the inexible technology if its competitor's equity level
is small, that is, if A
2
2 (0; 1:2), the exible technology for intermediate equity levels, that is,
for A
2
2 (2:4; 2:44), and again the inexible technology if its competitor's equity level is large,
that is, if A
2
2 (3:04; 5).
When rms are totally nanced by equity, they choose the exible technology. This tech-
nology allows rms to take advantage of the opportunities oered when demand is high. Firms
adopt the exible technology in spite of its two disadvantages : a higher xed cost and a lower
prot when demand is low. If equity is reduced and borrowing necessary, a exible rm may go
bankrupt if the demand is low. It can eliminate this risk if it chooses the inexible technology,
allowing a reduction in the amount borrowed and an increase in prot when demand is low at
the cost of a reduction in prot when demand is high. The expected value and variance of prot
decrease. These eects explain the switch in equilibrium from (f; f) to (i; f) when the equity of
rm 1 decreases.
But the technological switch of rm 1 may also make the exible technology of the other
rm more risky. When rm 1 becomes inexible, the expected value and variance of prot for
the exible rm 2 increase. This may make the rm bankrupt if demand is low. By choosing an
inexible technology, the rm can reduce the variance of its prot. This explains the existence of
two equilibria in zone Y of Figure 1 and of a unique equilibrium (i; i) in the hatched zone. When
rms have very low equity, a change in technology is insuÆcient to eliminate the probability
of bankruptcy. The previous eect disappears and rms choose again exible technologies.
Hence, when the capacity of the inexible technology is low, the presence of debt favors exible
technologies because they are less risky, the variance of prot being lower.
This example is very instructive. It shows that the technological exibility choices of the
rms depend on their level of equity. Hence, on two perfectly identical markets, the technological
congurations may dier if the rms have dierent access to equity nancing. One cannot
predict which technological conguration will emerge simply from observing demand and costs
conditions.
Example 2: x 2 X
2
;  = 0:5, 
1
= 5, 
2
= 10, x = 2:5,  = 1, c = 0:2, K = 3, H = 0:5,
B = 6. Again, we consider rst a common equity level for both rms, that is A
h
= A for h = 1; 2
13
(Figure 2), before looking at the more general case of asymmetric levels (Figure 2
0
).
-
FIGURE 2 (example 2)
[in Y, (f; f) and (i; i)]
A
0
Y
.125
(i; i)
.94
Y
2.18
(f; f)
3
Y
3.5
If both rms are all equity rms, there are two equilibria (f; f) and (i; i), so that the rms may
fall into a exibility trap since (i; i) would be more protable for both of them. If the equity
levels decrease but remain equal to each other, then (f; f) becomes the unique equilibrium. If
equity decreases even more, we have again two equilibria (f; f) and (i; i) but, contrary to the
rst situation, prots are now higher in the (f; f) equilibrium. The rms may here fall into
an inexibility trap. A further decrease in equity levels brings (i; i) as the unique equilibrium.
Last, if the rms have close to zero equity, there are again two equilibria (f; f) and (i; i) with
the latter being more protable for both rms.
When the equity levels dier, other equilibria appear (see Figure 2
0
).
Insert Figure 2
0
here
There exist two sets of equity values for which the rms choose opposite technologies. There
are also equity values for which (f; f) and (i; i) are equilibria but with no trap since none is
uniformly better for both rms. Again, the observation of demand and cost conditions in an
industry is not suÆcient to predict which technological conguration will emerge. If the rms
are totally nanced by equity, there are two technological equilibrium conguration: (f; f) and
(i; i). The existence of these two pure strategies equilibria may be explained by the strategic
value of exibility. Assume that the initial situation is (i; i). If a rm changes its technology and
chooses exibility, it will be able to adapt its output level to the demand level. It will decrease
its production when the demand is low and increase it when the demand is high. This increases
the rm's prot but not enough to cover the larger xed cost of the exible technology. But if
the other rm is also exible, then adoption of the exible technology has strategic eects: the
14
rm commits herself in a credible way to an higher output level when demand is high. This
commitment induces the other rm, also exible, to decrease its output level when the demand is
high. In this context, exibility has a positive strategic value. When demand is low the opposite
eect arises and exibility has a negative strategic value. For the parameter values of example
2, the net strategic value of exibility is positive. When a rm adopts the exible technology,
the value of exibility increases for the other rm as well. This eect explains the existence of
the two pure strategy equilibria.
9
If one rm has initially less equity, it must borrow and may end up bankrupt (with proba-
bility 1/2) if the demand is low when the technological conguration is (i; i). By switching to
exibility, the rm already in debt must borrow additional funds to nance the higher xed cost
of the exible technology. But its increase in prot when demand is low is more important and
eliminates the risk of bankruptcy. When the rm in debt changes its technology, the other rm
is induced to change its technology too: there is a unique equilibrium technological conguration
(f; f).
Hence, when the capacity of the inexible technology is intermediate, the equilibrium techno-
logical conguration can evolve toward more exibility or more inexibility as leverage increases
because the level of risk linked to a technology depends on the technology chosen by the other
rm.
Example 3: x 2 X
3
;  = 0:1; 
1
= 4; 
2
= 15; x = 5;  = 1; c = 0:2; K = 4; H = 0:5,
B = 6. The common equity level case is illustrated in Figure 3 and the more general case of
asymmetric levels in Figure 3
0
.
-
FIGURE 3 (example 3)
A
0
(i; i)
.89
(i; f), (f; i)
2.9
(f; f)
4
(i; i)
4.5
As in the preceding two examples, the equilibrium technological conguration is changing with
the equity levels. When the levels of equity are the same for both rms, A
h
= A; h = 1; 2, the
9
For more on the strategic value of technological choices, see Boyer, Jacques and Moreaux (2000).
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rms both choose the inexible technology if they have a relatively large level of equity, A > 4.
For intermediate equity levels, 2:9 < A < 4, they both switch to the exible technology. For
lower equity levels, 0:89 < A < 2:9, they choose dierent technologies and for even lower equity
levels, A < 0:89, they both come back to the inexible technology. The case of asymmetric
equity positions is illustrated in Figure 3
0
.
In this example, the capacity of the inexible technology is so high that a rm using this
technology always shuts down when the demand is low. As a result, the probability of bankruptcy
of an inexible rm is strictly positive as soon as its debt is strictly positive. A leveraged rm
then prefer to switch to a exible technology, thereby eliminating the risk of bankruptcy. When
the rm's debt is larger, choosing a exible technology eliminates the risk of bankruptcy if the
other rm is inexible but not if the other rm is exible. Therefore in equilibrium, one rm
switches to the exible technology to eliminate its risk of bankruptcy while the other keeps an
inexible technology and a positive probability of bankruptcy. If equity levels are very low, the
real option value of exibility disappears and the rms end up in a (i; i) equilibrium as when
equity is very large.
We can conclude this section 4 by saying that the impact of equity nancing on the tech-
nological conguration of an industry is, as illustrated in examples 1 to 5, a rather subtle non
monotonous impact combining decision theoretic eects, real option eects and strategic eects.
5 The strategic value of equity
The fact that the level of equity, assumed to be exogenous till now, can change the technological
best reply functions suggests that the level of equity could be chosen strategically. Note however
that the best responses are functions of both the equity level and the bankruptcy cost which
are substitute commitment devices. Hence it is the pair (A
h
; B) which has a strategic value.
In order to appreciate the competitive potential of an industry, we have to look at what could
be called the industry `commitment index', a function of both the equity nancing and the
bankruptcy cost.
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5.1 Equity nancing as a commitment device
In the previous section we assumed that A
h
, the capital invested in his business by entrepreneur
h, was his given initial wealth and that because of the agency problem, the entrepreneur could
not raise additional funds through external equity. We relax that assumption in this section. We
will assume that the entrepreneur's initial wealth is larger than K+H but that in a preliminary
stage 0, the two entrepreneurs choose simultaneously the amounts A
h
they will invest in their
respective rms. If the invested capital is lower than the cost of the chosen technology, the rm
must borrow. We show next that there exist cases in which the entrepreneurs decide to nance
their rms in part through borrowing in order to modify in a credible way their technological
reaction functions.
Let us examine again example 1 (Figure 1
0
). If the rms are whole equity rms, the tech-
nological equilibrium is (f; f). Each rm's expected prot is then equal to 1.62 even if in the
technological conguration (i; i), their common expected prot would be higher at 2.6 (See
Appendix C). When the rms are all equity nanced, they play a prisoner dilemma game. If
they decrease their equity capital, they alter the payo matrix and they avoid the dilemma. In
example 1, if both rms have an equity capital of A = 3, they play a subgame admitting (f; f)
and (i; i) as equilibria and they never go bankrupt. For even lower equity capital, the rms
can reach the unique equilibrium conguration (i; i) which is better for them than (f; f). By
reducing their equity capital, the rms credibly commit not to reply to inexibility by exibility.
When the rival is inexible, a exible rm earns a high prot level when demand is high but a
low prot level when demand is low. Hence, if the rm must borrow a large amount to buy the
exible technology, it goes bankrupt when demand is low. The expected bankruptcy cost makes
exibility less attractive than inexibility when the other rm is inexible. When the best reply
to inexibility switches from exibility to inexibility, the rms avoid the prisoner dilemma and
play a coordination game. Therefore rms can both increase their expected prots by choosing
strategically their capital structure:
10
debt has a strategic value in this context.
10
The rms would be better o eliminating the conguration (f; f) as an equilibrium by reducing even more
their equity capital but such capital structures are not equilibria of the preliminary stage reduced form game: a
rm would be better o deviating and increasing its equity capital to A
h
= 4 to induce the conguration (f; i) as
the unique equilibrium. If rms were choosing their capital structure sequentially, a form of coordination among
rms, they would avoid this problem. The leader would then choose A
1
= 3 and the follower A
2
= 2:42 with
17
In example 2 (Figure 2
0
), the best technological conguration for the rms is (i; i) with
nancing mainly through equity A
h
> 3. This equilibrium (i; i) is not unique and there is
a exibility trap here. A lower level of equity would eliminate this trap but one of the two
rms would then go bankrupt when demand is low. The bankruptcy cost makes this strategy
unattractive. So the rms will choose not to borrow. However debt may have a strategic value
as in the following example 4:  = 0:5; 
1
= 5; 
2
= 10; x = 4;  = 1; c = 0:2; K = 2:5; H =
0:1 and B = 3, with its equilibrium technological congurations depicted in Figure 4. If the
rms are all equity rms, the unique equilibrium is (i; i), even if rms would earn greater prots
in the technological conguration (f; f), hence an inexibility trap here. If the rms cut down
their equity capital to A
h
= 2:45, the equilibrium of the following subgame becomes (f; i) or
(i; f) and the sum of prots increases. But these equity levels are not an equilibrium of the
preliminary stage game. A rm would deviate to be an all equity rm. On the other hand, rms
can increase their expected prots by cutting down sharply their equity capital to say A
h
= 0:8;
the subgame then admits two equilibria (f; f) and (i; i). In the latter equilibrium, one rm
goes bankrupt when demand is low. In the former one, rms never go bankrupt. If the two
equilibria have the same probability, the expected payo of rms increases. Furthermore, these
are equilibrium capital structures. Debt can again increase the expected prots of both rms.
Insert Figure 4 here
Last, let us consider the following example 5 for the case of a large capacity level of the
inexible technology, x 2 X
3
:  = 0:3; 
1
= 5; 
2
= 18; x = 6;  = 1; c = 0:2; K = 4; H =
0:75 and B = 3, with its equilibrium technological congurations depicted in Figure 5. In this
example one rm chooses to be an all equity rm with the inexible technology and the other
rm chooses A
h
2 (2:2; 4) together with the exible technology. The more protable rm is
the exible rm. Debt allows the rm to select the most protable technology. In example 3
(x 2 X
3
), the capital structure could be used strategically to increase the expected prots of
both rms. In example 5 (x 2 X
3
), the capital structure is used strategically by one rm to
increase its expected prot at the expense of the other.
11
the unique technological equilibrium being (i; i). In this conguration, the rms never go bankrupt. So raising
borrowed capital has no cost.
11
The strategic commitment value of issuing debt is emphasized when the rms choose their technologies
18
Insert Figure 5 here
Clearly, whatever the capacity level of the inexible technology, there exist subsets of pa-
rameter values for which the equilibrium capital structures combine equity and debt. In these
equilibria, the debt is used strategically to modify the equilibrium technological conguration
of the industry which would have emerged had the entrepreneurs decided to nance their rms
through equity only.
5.2 The strategic increase of bankruptcy costs
We showed above that the capital structure can be used strategically in order to inuence
the technological choice of the rival when the bankruptcy costs are high enough to change
the technological best reply functions (propositions 4.2 to 4.7). A reduction in bankruptcy costs
would no more allow this strategic use of the capital structure and therefore may indeed decrease
the expected prots of the rms. In these cases, the rms could try to articially increase the
bankruptcy costs. A simple way to do that is, for entrepreneurs, to oer judiciously chosen
assets as collateral for their debt or induce banks to ask for those collateral assets.
12
The bank and the entrepreneur may have dierent evaluations of the collateral assets, some
assets having a greater value for the debtor than for the creditor. In general, this dierence
is ineÆcient and the contracting parties have an interest to choose the assets with the lowest
evaluation dierence. However Williamson (1983, 1985) argues that in some contracts, it may be
better that the collateral assets have a low value for the creditor. This can prevent a cancellation
of the contract aimed at seizing the collateral assets. Our analysis proposes another explanation
for this kind of behavior. Increasing the dierence of evaluation increases the bankruptcy cost
and so increases the commitment power of debt.
13
sequentially. If the two rms are all equity rms, the leader chooses exibility and the follower chooses inexibility
with payos of 21.35 and 20.78 respectively. However, by choosing A
2
= 3, the follower changes its best reply
to exibility in the following stage. If the leader chooses exibility, the follower then chooses exibility too with
payo of 20.66 for both. The leader then prefers inexibility and the follower chooses exibility with payos of
20.78 and 21.35 respectively. The follower, by issuing debt, can outperform the leader in terms of prot. There is
another perfect equilibrium in which the leader chooses A
h
2 (2:2; 4) with the exible technology and the follower
is an all equity rm with the inexible technology; but, in the rst stage, the leader plays a weakly dominated
strategy. See Ellingsen (1995) for an analysis of games with a similar structure although in a dierent context.
12
See Freixas and Rochet (1997, chapters 4 and 5) for references.
13
We nd in Shakespeare, The merchant of Venice [I; 3], an extreme example of this type of debt contract:
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Another way to increase the bankruptcy costs is to delegate the investment decision to a
manager to be red in case of bankruptcy. If the control of the rm gives to the manager
enough private benets, then the manager will choose the technology which minimize the rm's
bankruptcy probability. In order to increase the bankruptcy costs and give them strategic value,
shareholders can provide more private benets to the manager.
6 Conclusion
The bankruptcy costs and the equity levels of rms have signicant impacts on the equilib-
rium technological congurations in an industry. These eects arise because indebted rms,
either exible or inexible, may want to change their technologies to reduce the probability
of bankruptcy. When the capacity level associated with the inexible technology is low, the
equilibrium technological conguration of the industry is more inexible if rms have moderate
levels of equity than if they are whole equity rms (Figure 1). When that capacity level is large,
moderate levels of equity make the technological conguration of the industry more exible (Fig-
ure 3). The eect of equity is not monotonous. An industry may have the same technological
equilibrium for low and high levels of debt, with a dierent equilibrium for intermediate levels
of debt.
The endogeneity of technological choices is likely to be an important determinant of the
optimal capital structure and of the relationship between capital structure and product market
competition. Our results allow us to take some steps in characterizing the role of endogenous
technological exibility choices, whose analysis has been neglected in the literature.
\Shylock:
This kindness will I show.
Go with me to a notary, seal me there
Your single bond, and, in a merry sport,
If you repay me not on such a day,
In such a place, such a sum or sums as are
Expressed in the condition, let the forfeit
Be nominated for an equal pound
Of your fair esh, to be cut o and taken
In what part of your body pleaseth me.
Antonio:
Content, in faith - I'll seal to such a bond,
And say there is much kindness in the Jew."
20
The main determinants of capital structure, as modeled and identied in the literature, can be
regrouped under four major headings: taxation, information asymmetries together with conicts
of interest, competitive positioning and nally corporate control.
14
If the interest payments are
tax-deductible while dividends are not, debt has an advantage over equity. Conicts between
shareholders and managers may arise because managers, when owning only a small percentage
of shares, may end up exerting a suboptimal level of eort and investing the free cash ows
in perks and acquisitions of low value (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Jensen 1986). Conicts
between shareholders and debtholders arise because the payo of shareholders [debtholders] is
a convex [concave] function of the rm's prot: the shareholders prefer riskier projects (Jensen
and Meckling 1976). Information asymmetries between managers and outside investors on the
protability of the rm is a third determinant whose importance decreases as the rm carries
more debt because the evaluation of the rm's debt is less sensitive to specic informations
(Myers and Majluf 1984) and the expected bankruptcy costs increase faster for a rm with
low protability (Ross 1977). A rm's capital structure may also modify its own behavior and
the behavior of its competitors on product markets: managers take more risk or may be more
cooperative when the rm carries debt and therefore debt can be used as a credible commitment
to increase the level of output (Brander and Lewis 1986) or to set higher prices (Showalter 1995).
Finally, the rm's capital structure may modify the probability of a successful takeover by an
outside investor. In order to determine the optimal combination between debt and equity, rms
must consider simultaneously these determinants. The signicance of each determinant depends
on the specic environment of the rm.
Our analysis emphasizes the strategic eects of capital structure through not only a marginal
change in product quantity or price but also in far reaching technology changes
15
modifying the
organization and the market strategy of the rm. This determinant is likely to be even more
important than the other ones in part because other less costly means may be available to achieve
the objectives behind the other determinants. For instance, conicts between stakeholders can
be soften by more sophisticated managerial contracts and the likelihood of a hostile takeover
14
See for instance the recent contributions of Harris and Raviv (1991), Hart (1995), Rajan and Zingales (1995),
Leland and Toft (1996).
15
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) among others study
the impact of capital structure on the level of investment in rms but they do not consider the dierent specic
technologies acquired through these investments.
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can be reduced by a strategic allocation of voting rights. For some market contexts or industry
parameters, debt has a strategic value and increases a rm's expected prot (see examples 1,
3 and 4 above) but in other contexts debt is a source of weakness for the rm and decreases
its expected prot. Example 2 illustrates this last point. In this example, debt can solve the
coordination problem due to multiple equilibrium technological congurations but may lead to
the selection of a Pareto-dominated equilibrium.
According to Brander and Lewis (1986), the output level increases with the debt level whereas
in Glazer (1994), the output level decreases in the rst period and increases in the second period
as debt increases. In Showalter (1995), higher debt induces lower prices, that is higher output
levels, when costs are uncertain, while the opposite eect holds when demand is uncertain. In
our model, the link between debt levels and output levels is more subtle since debt not only
induces changes in output and prices given the technologies but also changes in the technologies
themselves. In example 1 above, a switch from (f; f) to (i; i) increases output if demand is low
but decreases output if demand is high. In example 2, the same switch decreases output in the
two states of demand.
It is nevertheless possible to draw some general results. If the market size is high relative
to the capacity of the inexible technology, debt favors inexible equilibrium technological con-
gurations resulting in less variability in industry output but more variability in prices. If the
market size is small relative to the capacity of the inexible technology, opposite eects emerge.
In the intermediate case, both situations are possible depending on the industry parameters.
Therefore, the eects characterized by Brander and Lewis (1986), Glazer (1994) and Showalter
(1995) depend closely on the assumption that a single technology is available. If rms are al-
lowed to choose between dierent exibility levels, technological or organizational, the impacts
of debt become much more subtle.
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APPENDIX
A Cournot equilibria, debt thresholds and expected prots
By assumption, the state of demand is observed before the second stage Cournot competition
takes place. For a state of the market , the Cournot reaction function of a exible rm h is
q
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 < x < (
1
  c)=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above
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the expected prot of both rms is given by (12) with
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1
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1
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3
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B Technological best response
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C Examples used in the text
Example 1:  = 0:5, 
1
= 5, 
2
= 10, x = 2,  = 1, c = 0:2, K = 4, H = 1 and B = 2.
Prot levels:
3:04  A
h
E(f; f) = 1:62 > E(i; f) = 1:30
E(f; i) = 3:59 > E(i; i) = 2:60
2:44  A
h
< 3:04 E(f; f) = 1:62 > E(i; f) = 1:30
E(f; i) = 2:59 < E(i; i) = 2:60
2:4  A
h
< 2:44 E(f; f) = 0:62 < E(i; f) = 1:30
E(f; i) = 2:59 < E(i; i) = 2:60
1:2  A
h
< 2:4 E(f; f) = 0:62 < E(i; f) = 1:30
E(f; i) = 2:59 > E(i; i) = 1:60
A
h
< 1:2 E(f; f) = 0:62 > E(i; f) = 0:30
E(f; i) = 2:59 > E(i; i) = 1:60
Example 2:  = 0:5, 
1
= 5, 
2
= 10, x = 2:5,  = 1, c = 0:2, K = 3, H = 0:5 and B = 6.
Prot levels:
3  A
h
E(f; f) = 3:11 > E(i; f) = 3:00
E(f; i) = 3:82 < E(i; i) = 4:44
2:18  A
h
< 3 E(f; f) = 3:11 > E(i; f) = 3:00
E(f; i) = 3:82 > E(i; i) = 2:94
0:94  A
h
< 2:18 E(f; f) = 3:11 > E(i; f) = 3:00
E(f; i) = 0:82 < E(i; i) = 2:94
0:125  A
h
< 0:94 E(f; f) = 0:11 < E(i; f) = 3:00
E(f; i) = 0:82 < E(i; i) = 2:94
A
h
< 0:125 E(f; f) = 0:11 > E(i; f) = 0:00
E(f; i) = 0:82 < E(i; i) = 2:94
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Example 3:  = 0:1, 
1
= 4, 
2
= 15, x = 5,  = 1, c = 0:2, K = 4, H = 0:5 and B = 6.
Prot levels:
4  A
h
E(f; f) = 17:56 < E(i; f) = 18:05
E(f; i) = 17:47 < E(i; i) = 17:60
2:9  A
h
< 4 E(f; f) = 17:56 > E(i; f) = 17:45
E(f; i) = 17:47 > E(i; i) = 17:00
0:89  A
h
< 2:9 E(f; f) = 16:96 < E(i; f) = 17:45
E(f; i) = 17:47 > E(i; i) = 17:00
A
h
< 0:89 E(f; f) = 16:96 < E(i; f) = 17:45
E(f; i) = 16:87 < E(i; i) = 17:00
Example 4:  = 0:5, 
1
= 5, 
2
= 10, x = 4,  = 1, c = 0:2, K = 2:5, H = 0:1 and B = 3.
Prot levels:
2:5  A
h
E(f; f) = 4:02 < E(i; f) = 4:10
E(f; i) = 1:69 < E(i; i) = 1:90
2:44  A
h
< 2:5 E(f; f) = 4:02 < E(i; f) = 4:10
E(f; i) = 1:69 > E(i; i) = 1:15
0:9  A
h
< 2:44 E(f; f) = 4:02 < E(i; f) = 4:10
E(f; i) = 0:19 < E(i; i) = 1:15
0:04  A
h
< 0:9 E(f; f) = 4:02 > E(i; f) = 2:60
E(f; i) = 0:82 < E(i; i) = 1:15
A
h
< 0:04 E(f; f) = 2:51 < E(i; f) = 2:60
E(f; i) = 0:82 < E(i; i) = 1:15
Example 5:  = 0:3, 
1
= 5, 
2
= 18, x = 6,  = 1, c = 0:2, K = 4, H = 0:75 and B = 3.
Prot levels:
4  A
h
E(f; f) = 20:66 < E(i; f) = 20:78
E(f; i) = 21:35 > E(i; i) = 20:36
2:19  A
h
< 4 E(f; f) = 20:66 > E(i; f) = 19:88
E(f; i) = 21:35 > E(i; i) = 19:46
A
h
< 2:19 E(f; f) = 19:76 < E(i; f) = 19:88
E(f; i) = 21:35 > E(i; i) = 19:46
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FIGURE 1
0
Equilibrium technological congurations in example 1, x 2 X
1
;
in hatched zone, (i; i);
in Y, either (f; f) or (i; i);
in V, (f; i) or (i; f);
in W, no equilibrium in pure strategies.
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Figure 2
0
Equilibrium technological congurations in example 2, x 2 X
2
;
in Y, either (f; f) or (i; i);
in Z, (f; f).
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FIGURE 3
0
Equilibrium technological congurations in example 3, x 2 X
3
;
in V, (f; i) or (i; f).
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Figure 4
Equilibrium technological congurations in example 4, x 2 X
2
;
in Y, (f; f) or (i; i);
in S, (f; i);
in T, (i; f);
in V, (f; i) or (i; f);
in W, no equilibrium in pure strategies.
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FIGURE 5
Equilibrium technological congurations in example 5, x 2 X
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in V, (f; i) or (i; f).
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